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ABSTRACT 
As anyone familiar with Kenya knows, Hararrbee, or self-help is 
a pervasive phenomenon which engages just about all rural dwellers, many 
city dwellers, most politicians and many state personnel. The widespread 
popularity and political significance of self-help has been documented 
in the literature for over a decade. Most studies, however, have assumed 
a rather homogeneous peasantry, and failed to examine the differential 
popularity of self-help in terms of the varying material circumstances 
of different strata within the Kenyan peasantry. 
This essay is addressed to the neglected question of what, precisely, 
is the social base of self-help. Based on survey research data from 2,075 
respondents in seven districts, this paper argues that Hararrbee is parti-
cularly popular among "small" and "middle" peasants - those who own between 
one and ten acres of land. 
The paper further argues that the landless obtain benefits from 
Harambee projects as virtual "free riders" while "rich" peasants (those 
owning more than twenty acres) subsidize the poorer elerrents of the 
community through what is in effect a progressive form of local taxation. 
Whether "rich" peasants support Harambee, to the extent of their ability to 
pay, however, is an unresolved question. 
INTRODUCTION IDS/WP 440 
As anyone familiar.with Kenya knows, Harambee or self-help is 
a pervasive phenomenon which engages just about all rural dwellers, many 
city dwellers, most politicians and many state personnel. Self-help 
primarily means the construction of social service infrastructure by the 
residents of rural communities to meet locally defined needs. Most, 
albeit not all, self-help efforts are small scale development projects 
devoted to the provision of collective goods to be enjoyed by all 
households (if not all, individual members) of the local community: nursery, 
primary, and secondary schools; village polytechnics; cattle dips; health 
centers; water projects. In addition, there are efforts such as mutual 
add and production groups which are collective in operation, but whose 
benefits are private in that their distribution is restricted to a set 
of particular individuals, usually women. The initiation, financing, and 
organization of these projects comes primarily from within the community 
with assistance often sought from without. And while communities may 
manage and finance most projects over the long-term, there usually is an 
effort to transfer the very expensive recurrent costs and management 
responsibilities of large projects to the state. 
As such, self-help projects have become the "stuff" of grass-
roots politics in Kenya -- the principal activity around which political 
leaders and aspiring leaders seek to establish and maintain their political 
careers. Members of the local district councils in Kenya, and would be 
members establish reputations of community service by raising funds for 
self-help projects and by lobbying the civil service to assist projects 
in their areas. Members of Parliament and aspiring members likewise seek 
to "deliver the goods" on self-help, and by so doing draw local self-help 
organizations into their personal political machines and in turn attach their 
machine to the clientelist structures which dominate Kenyan politics and 
control patronage at the center of the Kenyan system. 
Joel D. Barkan, "Bringing Home the Pork: Legislative Behavior, Rural 
.Development and Political change in East Africa," in Joel Smith and 
Lloyd Muswlf (eds.), Legislatures in Development. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 19797 pp. 265-88; Joel D. Barka'n, "Legislators, 
Elections, and Political Linkage" in Politics and Public Policy in 
Kenya and Tanzania, op.cit,, pp. 71-101; and Njuguna Ngethe, Harambee 
and Development Participation-in Kenya.. (Ph.D. dissertation) Ottawa: 
Carleton University, 1979. 
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The widespread popularity and political significance of self-
2 
help has been documented in the literature for over a decade. The 
studies to date, however, including cur own, have tended to assume a 
rather homogeneous peasantry, That is to say, there have been no 
attempts to examine the. differential popularity of self-help in terms 
of the varying material circumstances of different strate within the 
Kenyan peasantry. 
Our purpose in this essay, therefore, is to address ourselves 
to the neglected question of what, precisely, is the social base of 
self-help? Who in rural society is more and less prone to embrace it, 
lead it, and perceive personal and family benefits in it? Who is most 
prone to believe in its future? By examining the social base of self-
help which is acknowledged to be close to the heart of Kenyan rural 
3 
politics, we shall also examine the social base of much of Kenyan 
politics. The principle thesis of this essay is that "small" and 
"middle peasants," constitute the vital base of self-help, and that 
this fundamental fact goes a long way in explaining why the Harambee 
ideology has become the core of an emergent public philosophy in Kenya --
a set of widely held values which has shaped the rules of Kenyan politics, 
imbued the political system with a measure of legitimacy, and forced the 
Kenyan state to be minimally accountable to the public it governs. ,,, .-
2. Joel D. Barkan, Frank Holmquist, David Gachuki and S.E. Migot-Adholla, 
"Is Small Beautiful?" Occasional Paper No.15, Comparative Legislative 
Research Center, University of Iowa, 19 79; Joel D. Barkan, "Self-Help 
Organizations, State and Society," Occasional Paper No.21, Comparative 
Legislative Research Center, University of Iowa, 1981; Frank Holmquist, 
"Implementing Rural Development Projects," in Goran Hyden, Robert 
Jackson and John J. Okumu (eds.) Development Administration: The Kenyan 
Experience. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 19 70, pp.201-22; Frank 
Holmquist "Defending Peasant Political Space in Independent Africa," 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 14(19 80), pp.157-67; Frank Holmquist, 
"Class Structure, Peasant Participation, and Rural Self-Help" in Joel 
D. Barkan (ed.), Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, rev. 
ed., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, pp.171-97; Frank Holmquist, 
"Self-Help: The State and Peasant Leverage in Kenya," Africa, 54:3, 
(1984), pp. 72-91; Philip Mbithi and Ramus Rasmuson, Self-Reliance in 
Kenya: The Case of Harambee. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies, 1977; Barbara. P. Thomas, Politics, Participation and Poverty: 
Development Through'Self-Help in Kenya. Boulder: Westview,Press, 1985; 
Edgar V. Winans and Angelique.Haugerud, "Rural s4lfrHelp in Kenya:. The 
Harambee Movement," Human Organization, (1977), pp.334-51. 
3. Joel J). Barkan, "Bringing Home the Pork,!' op.cit.'and "Legislators 
Elections and Political Linkage," op.cit..; and Njuguna Ngethe, 
Harambee and Development Participation in Kenya, op.cit. 
f < 
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Self-help in Kenya is a community-wide phenomen. Regardless 
of the nature and divisions within local communities, the vast majority 
of all residents — almost 90 per cent — are or have been involved in 
the self-help process. For those familiar with the distribution of land 
ownership in Kenya, this finding may "be a surprise. Indeed, a glance 
at the data would suggest that community-wide self-help is impossible 
given the extraordinarirly high concentration of land in few hands. 
According to Alice Amsden, ''(l)less than 5 percent of all farms account 
for almost 50 percent of all farm land, while some 30 percent of the 
smallest farms account for less than 2 percent of all farm land." 
Community-wide self-help cannot occur in a community environment where . 
the divisions between rich and poor are so marked, and where those at 
5 
the bottom are normally excluded from benefits controled by the rich* 
The small farm and large farm sectors, however, are geographically distinct 
and self-contained. Self-help flourishes in the areas of the former where 
most of the population resides, and where the degree of inequity in the 
pattern of land ownership is much less prounced.^' 
4.Alice B. Amsden, "A Review of Kenya's Political Economy Since 
Independence", Journal of African Studies, 1 )(1974), p„423. 
5.Recent research by Barkan in the Indian state of Rajasthan indicated 
that community-wide self-help was a rarity, becuase of extreme 
inequalities and the pervasiveness of the caste ststem. The rich had 
no incentive to join with the poor, and the poor never expect such. 
6.For two recent discussions in the long debate on the question of land 
ownership and inequality in Kenya see Alila, Patrick 0.9 Gatheru Wanjohi 
and Kabiru Kinyanjui, "Rural Landlessness Situation in Kenya," Report 
for FA0 Expert Consultation on Landlessness: Dynamics, Problems and 
Policies, Rome, October, 1985. 
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As we search for the social base of self-help, we are also 
mindful of the fact that because almost all Kenyans are involved in self-
help, self-help means different things to different participants. As 
such, it is also sociologically "messy." It embraces many of the most 
severe tensions in the Kenyan political economy, and its implications 
are contradictory. Depending on who one talks to and what one reads, 
self-help is described as either a cooptive device employed by the Kenyan 
ruling class to tax and manipulate the peasantry, or as an unalloyed 
vehicle of mass peasant interests. Neither perspective squares with the 
facts. A more accurate view is that self-help is an arena of contested 
terrain that experiences a changing balance of forces and which has 
produced different outcomes over time. During the colonial era, the 
Kikuyu Independent Schools Movement represented self-help as a locally 
initiated vehicle of peasant protest, and provided an organizational base 
for African nationalisn. Official self-help, known as "community development" 
was, on the other hand, a state-led initiative to coopt those opposed 
to the colonial regime. Post-colonial self-help, on the other hand, 
is best termed as "'naif-way" because it comprises elements of both local, 
7 
state and outside initiative, leadership, funds and management. 
RURAL STRATIFICATION, CLASS FORMATION AND THE AFRICAN PEASANTRY 
Two themes have dominated the literature on the nature of rural 
populations in the lefs developed countries, and the peasantry in particular. 
The first, and oldest, was articulated in the "liberal development and 
modernization" literature of the 1950s and 1960s. While acknowledging 
the diversity of indigenous African political systems, and the fact that 
these systems were sometimes marked by sharp distictions between the 
rulers and the ruled, the development and modernization literature 
nontheless treated the peasantry as a homogeneous and undifferentiated 
sector of society. As such, the peasantry was assumed to be bound by 
tradition, averse to risk, parochial in outlook, and having little 
relation to the state. Politically, the peasantry was viewed as having 
7. Frank Holmquist, "Class Structure, Participation, and Rural Self-
Help" op.cit., p.181. 
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no politics other than the protection of ethnic interests and/or of 
8 
avoiding the state. Economically, the peasantry was perceived as the 
stagnant rural periphery of a "dual economy" driven by a dynamic urban 
core. The development of the periphery was thus viewed as being dependent 
on its penetration and direction by the core — a process which would 
be led by emergent bureaucratic elites and which would result in the 
transfer of the necdssary inputs for development from the center to the 
rural areas. The process would turn on the extension administrative 
control into the countryside, and with it '.the expanded provision of 
Western values, education, technology, and capital. Conceived in this 
manner, the developmental process involved the displacement of indifenous 9 
"traditional" practices by "Western/modern" ones. Put differently, 
the rural populations of the countryside would become more differentiated 
and assimilated into the national political and economic system dominated 
by core. They would be "captured.""^ 
8 James S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome" in Binder et.al. (eds,) 
Crises and Sequences of Political Development. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973. pp.73-100; Walt W, Rostow, The Stages of Economic 
Growth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961. p.140. 
9 For .two early critiques of the assumption of displacement see Joseph 
R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study 
of Social Change," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (January, 1967), 
pp.351-62; and C. S. Whitaker, "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political 
Change," World Politics, XIX, 2(1967), pp.190-217. 
10.The term is Goran Hyden's in his widely read account of peasant-state 
relations in Tanzania. Though H/den argues that the Tanzanian peasant 
functions in a pre-capitalist mode of production, and has therefore 
not been assimilated into the world capitalist economy of the urban core, 
his paradigm for the developmental process shares the dualistic 
perspective of the 19 60s in that he regards the peasantry in undifferen-
tiated terms and assumes that their goals and those of the center are 
incompatible. In the same vein, James C. Scott has argued that the 
breakdown of the moral economy of the Southeast Asian peasantry was 
the result of the penetration of the village political economy by 
outside forces, principally the state. See Goran Hyden, 3eyond Ujamaa 
in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and the Uncaptuivd Peasantry.. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979 and James C. Scott, The Moral Economy 
of the Peasant. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 
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By the early 1970s another, almost polar opposite, theme emerged 
to challenge the conventional of the preceeding decade. In this 
view, the peasantry was highly differntiated and stratified in respect 
to incomef land ownership, and access to education, credit, technology 
and state services."1''1" Instead being regardad as "mired in tradition," 
peasants were now seen as "rational" and calculating actors who sought 
to maximize their self-interest under difficult conditions. Those who 
possessed a < cushion against loss were viewed as willing to take risks 
to improve their situations. Those who existed precariously on the edge 
12 
of survival, were not. Some observers also subscribed to a correlary 
view — that political interests were defined and pursued in a 13 
differentiated manner by different peasant strata or classes. These 
classes were assumed to be in conflict within rural communities,'and 
to develop different and competing relationships with the state. 
This view held that wealthy peasants who prospered from the farming of 
export commodities established an alliance of privilege with local 
bureaucrats that controled the state at the expense of small holders and 
14 the landless. 
Students of self-help in Kenya insert themselves into this 
analytical environment, though often unselfconsciously. Where a 
relatively undifferentiated peasantry is seen, there is a tendency to 
view the marriage of peasant and state in self-help as almost ideal — 
the hoped for confluence of peasant need and state response in the 
modernization pardigm. Where, however, the peasantry is viewed as 
highly stratified, there is the opposite tendency -- to see self-help as 
11. Keith Griffin> The Political Economy of Agrarian Change. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1974, chapter 2. 
12. James C. Scott, ibid. , pp.15-2.5. 
13. H.U.E. Toden Van Velzen, "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants" in Lionel 
Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania Vol. 2 
Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973, pp,153-79. 
14. Joel Samoff, "Underdevelopment and its Grassroots in Africa," 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 14, 1 (1980), pl3. 
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an exercise dominated by rich peasants and rural elites in alliance with 
a reactionary state at the expense of the rural poor. Perceived in this 
manner, the small and middle peasant majority are not served by self-
help but Manipulated, and at times coerced into a process that 
taxes them heavily yet provides them with very little. 
Whether self-help is therefore a vehicle through which the 
peasantry extracts resources from the rural rich and the center, or 
whether it is a vehicle through which the center and the rural rich dominate 
small farmers, is, of course, an empirical question. It is a question, 
however, that cannot be answered before determining the nature and 
extent of rural stratification, and following that, the social base of 
self-help: Which elements of the peasantry participate in self-help and 
why? How much do various strata invest in self-help? To what extent do 
various strata view self-help as a process that benefits them and a process 
over which they exercise control? 
The question of the extent of class formation and class action 
in rural Africa is a complex one which has only recently been the object 
of systematic study. In his thoughtful article on the nature of class 
domination in Africa, Richard Sklar reminds us that class formation, as 
well as class consolidation, class identificaiion, and class action are 
each dependent on the simultaneous presence of several objective 
conditions."'"5 Thus, class formation occurs when there is a social and 
political coalescence among individuals engaged in similar occupations; 
whose relationships (i.e. ownership/non-ownership, control/non-control) 
to the means of production are similar; and whose incomes and 
16 educational backgrounds are the same. Class consolidation, Sklar continues,, 
requires all of the above plus the measure of social organization required 
to establish the foundation of economic and political power for class 
17 members. Class consciousness is present when would-be class members 
15. Richard Sklar, "The Naturfe of Class Domination in Africa,Journal 
cf Modern African Studies, 17,4 (1979), pp.531-52. 
16. Ibid., pp.533-4. 
« 
17. Ibid., p. 538. 
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subscribe to a common set of values. Class action occurs when class 
members engage in a collective action, the effect of which is to "increase 
or reduce social inequality and domination, or to strengthen or weaken the 
18 means whereby the domination of a privileged stratum is maintained." 
Sklar's identification of the conditions which can be measured 
to determine the presence or absence of class phenomena in Africa was 
directed exclusively towards determining the parameters of dominant 
classes. Measurement of these same conditions can also determine the 
nature . and boundaries of subordinant classes including those residing 
in the rural areas.. Gavin Kitching seems to move in this direction 
when he suggests that class analysis per se may not get us very far 
19 
until the concept of class is "unpacked," that is to say, 
disaggregated and operationalized into a set of observable and measurable 
variables via which one might identify different strata within the 
rural population. 
Survey data collected in seven rural areas in 19 80 by Joel 
. 21 
Barkan and David Gachuki confirm Kitching's supposition. As indicated 
by the data presented in Tables 1 to 4, the picture of class 
formation in rural Kenya is not a "neat" as some writers would lead us 
to believe. While such measures of stratification as land ownership, 
income and occupation correlate with each other, the degree of 
correlation is weak. This in turn suggests that the presence of 
classes (as distinct from strata) in the rural areas and the boundaries 
between classes might be difficult to discern. 
1§. Ibid., p.547. 
19. Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980, pp.3-5. 
20. Ibid., p.330 
21. Data from the 1980 survey is from 2,075 respondents living in 
seven parliamentary constituencies in rural Kenya: Embu-South, 
Githunguri, Kajiado-North, Laikipia-West, Ikolomani, Mbiti and 
Kitutu-East. Separate samples of 300 respondents were drawn for 
each constituency based on age-sex quotas computed after a review of 
the 1979 Kenyan census. Interviews for each sample of 300 respondents 
were randomly assigned to 30 sampling plots a half mile in diameter 
which were themselves ramdomly distributed across the constituency. Ten 
interviews were thus conducted in each plot. All interviewing was 
conducted in the local language of the clPCci CP in Swahili. 
- 9 -
Table 1; Monthly Income by Amount ef Land Owned 
IDS/WP 1440 
AMOUNT LAND OWNED 
• None 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-20 21+ 
MONTHLY INCOME* acres acres acres acres acres 
100/- or less: 49% 46% 30% 30% 31% 14% 
101/- to 500/-: 29 30 36 36 39 30 
501/- to 1,000/-: 7 9 16 18 17 25 
1,001/- to 3,000/-: 6 7 8 9 12 24 
3,001/- to 9,000/- 1 1 1 2 - 3 
9,0Cl/- or more: 8 7 10 6 2 2 
N = (221) (218) ( 279) (160) (59) (63) 
Pet. of total sample: 22% 22% 28% 16% 6% 6% 
*In Kenyan shillings 
Spearman R = , 201 
Table 2: Amount Land Owned by Monthly Income 
MONTHLY INCOME* 













None: 30: 20% 12% 15% 10% 23% 
1-2 acres: 27 20 15 19 10 22 
3-5 acres: 53 30 33 24 20 39 
6-10 acres: 13 17 21 16 30 14 
11-20 acres: 5 7 7 8 - 1 
21 acres or more: 3 6 12 17 30 1 
N = ( 367) (328) (135) (86) (10) (74) 
Pet. of total sample- 37% 33% 14% 9% 1% 7% 
"In Kenyan shillings 
Spearman R = . 201 
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The relationship between land ownership and income is a case in 
point. As shown in Table 1, a substantial proportion of large landowners 
are poor while a.small but significant proportion of landless reported high 
incomes. Seventy per cent of those owning 11 to 20 acres of land, for 
example, reported incomes of under 500 Kenyan shillings per month, a 
figure only somewhat lower (and within the range of sampling error) than 
the 78 per cent of landless respondents who said they were in this strata. 
Conversely, 8 percent of the respondents owning no land reported monthly 
incomes over 9,000 shillings, while the proportion for those owning-
11 to 20 acres, and for those owning more than 21 acres was 2. 
The weak relationship between personal income and what is normally 
assumed to be the main determinant of income in the rural areas, is 
demonstrated further in Table 2 where we have simply inverted the data 
presented in Table 1. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents earning, 
under 100 shillings per month own less than 2 acres, but the proportion 
for those earning over 9,000 shillings is 45. Conversely, 11 
percent of those earning under 100 shillings own 11 acres or more while 
the figure for the top income group is 2. Put more succinctly, the 
Spearman coeficient for the relationship between land ownership and income 
22 for our respondents is only . 201 . 
22. Several explanations for the weak relationship between income and 
the size of land holdings have appeared in the literature. Gavin 
Kitching has presented data which demonstrates that small holders 
farm their land more intensively, and place a greater proportion 
of their land more intensively, and place a greater proportion of 
their land more intensively, and place a greater proportion of their 
land under cultivation .than large farmers. Ecological conditions 
also account for lower productivity per acre and hence lower farm 
income per acre on large holdings many of which are located in less 
fertile regions. A substantial proportion of personal income, 
moreover, is desired from off-harm sources. See Gavin Kitching, 
Class and Economic Change in Kenya, op.cit., pp.330-74 and J. L. Lijodi 
and Hans Ruthenberg, "Income Distribution in Kenya's Agriculture," 
Zeitschrift fur Auslandische Landwirtschaft, 17(1978), p.124. 
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Different measures of stratification thus yield different 
profiles of stratification rather than a clear picture of discrete and 
identifiable classes. That the rural population of Kenya is highly 
stratified in respect to the standard measures of socio-economic position, 
and that there is inequality, is clear as can be seen from the entires 
in the bottom rows of both tables whi<;h indicate the proportion of the 
total sample which falls within each category (column) of the indepent 
variable. Though weak, a significant relationship between land ownership 
and income must also be acknowledged. The rural population, however, cannot 
be neatly be divided intc a landed bourgeoise of kulak farmers, and a 
landless or land impoverished rural underclass. Nor can the rural 
population be neatly divided into a category of "poor peasants" who a have 
little or no land and low incomes, a category of "middle peasants" who 
have some land and middle incomes, and a category of "rich peasants" 
who own large holdings and who have high incomes, because there are too 
many cases which cannot be accomodated by this typology. Any attempt, 
moreover, to isolate and compare the members of the rural population who 
can be so categorized is likely to yield dubious results. When 
preparing the data for this article, the authors attempted just such an 
analysis. After discarding more than 30 percent of the sample which 
did not fall into the three previously mentioned categories, we examined 
the cases that did fall within these categories to see whether they 
differed in respect to their levex of participation in self-help, their 
values, and their level of political involvement. Even when one 
employed this methodology of constructicng such "ideal" types for 
heuri st ic purposes., the salience of class, particularly in the form of 
class cong '.ousness and class action was not evident. 
An examination of the relationship between occupation and land 
ownership, and occupation and income as presented in Tables 3 and 4 yield 
a similar picture. As one might expect,,, respondents with high status 
occupations such as teachers and civil servants earn more than those who 
pursue occupations of lower rank. Again, however, the relationship is 
not tight. Nor do teachers and civil servants always control large 
amounts of land. Indeed, while 11 and 17 percent of these two 
occupational groups reported respectively that they owned more than 20 
acres, 19 and 28 percent reported that they owned none- In contrast, 
- 12 - IDS/WP 440 









100/- or less: 40 19% 5% 20% 1% - - % 
101/- to 500/-: 36 60 50 42 13 27 
501/- to 1,000/-: • 3 5 23 22 48 47 
1,001/- to 3,000/-: 4 6 7 11 37 27 
3,001/- to 9,000/- 1 — 2 2 1 — 
9,001/- or more: 12 10 14 2 1 — 
N = (628) (62) (44) (45) (125) (30) 
Est. average income: 216/- 252/- 484/- 244./- 650/- 515/-
*In Kenyan shillings 
Table Amount Land Owned by Occupation 
PRINCIPLE OCCUPATION 






None: 12% 36% 26% 11% 19% 2 Pi 
1-2 acres: 27 24 22 13 11 34 
3-5 acres: 30 25 35 23 31 35 
6-10 acres: 16 9 8 23 20 7 
11-20 acres: 8 2 6 17 9 7 
21 acres or more: 7 3 4 13 11 17 
N = (908) (99) (51) (53) (112"1 (29) 
Estimated average land 
holding 
(in acres): 3.09 . 1.46 2. 2.2 4. 83 3.75 3.78 
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shopkeepers ranked highest in terms of average land holdings but fifth 
in respect to average income. Whether the respondents in this 
last occupational category are part of a rural upper class, a middle 
23 class, or an underclass — or all three,, is thus difficult to determine. 
Our own "struggle" to generate a concept of class formation that 
is applicable to Kenya's rural population suggests that there is as yet 
no "class struggle" in rural Kenya, because there are no classes. 
Different strata with different intests that are at times in conflict, 
"yes," but not classes and class conflict in the classic Marxist sense of 
the terms. The significance of this seemingly bold assertion will become 
evident in the next section where we explore the relationships between 
the most powerful measure of rural stratification and various aspects of 
citizen participation in self-help. For the momentE however, we are left 
with several alternative measures of stratification with which to pursue our 
basic question of what is the social base of self-help. Which one(s) do we 
use? 
Space does not permit us to report the findings for all available 
measures. We have consequently chosen to limit our presentation to a 
discussion of the relationships that exist between one measure of rural 
stratification — the amount of land owned by our respondents — and 
several measures of citizen involvement in and perceptions ofself-help. 
We have chosen land ownership for three reasons. Firsts although the 
relationship between land ownership and personal income is weak, land 
ownership is the one variable which best descriminates between strata if 
of the Kenyan peasantry in respect to their levels participation in self-
help. Although income, occupation, and education all effect the level of 
citizen participation in self-help, the amount of land owned by an 
individual is the single most powerful determinant of his or her 
23 These figures also question the thesis"advanced by Gavin Kitching 
that the level of income derived from off-farm employment is 
the determinant of the size of land holdings in Kenya. Off-farm 
income, may, but does not necessarily lead to the control over large 
land.holdings, a qualification that Kitching himself concedes. See 
Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya, op.cit'. , p.'371. 
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involvement in self-help. Thus, if one wishes to test the hypothesis 
that different strata exhibit different levels of participation in self-
help, the best way to do so is to examine the impact of land ownership. 
If there are no differences in the level of support for self-help 
between different strata of land holders and the landless, then it is 
unlikely that there will be differential levels of support when other 
measures of stratification are employed. Conversely, the distribution of 
support for self-help by the level of 3and ownership, provides the cleareat 
picture of what elements in the population provide the social base for 
self-help, and which do not. 
A second reason why we have chosen to use land ownership as our 
measure of stratification is the importance of land ownership, 
particularly its social and political importance, in the minds of most 
Kenyans. Explanations of past political history in Kenya, and 
prognostications about the future invariably turn on the issue of the 
distribution of this scarce resource. Until such time as most Kenyans 
gain their livelihood from off-farm employment, land will be a primary 
(if not the sole) determinant of wealth and power in rural Kenya. Third, 
the data we possess on land ownership 
are both more extensive .and more 
valid, than the data we possess on individual income. More than 1,600 
respondents or 77 percent of our sample of 2,075 reported the size of 
their land holdings to our interviews compared to 1,146 or only 55 percent who were willing to divulge their monthly incomes. Questions 
about land holdings, however, is consistent with the distribution of 
24 land reported by the Kenya Integrated Rural Survey. 
24. Central Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey, 1974-75, 
Nairobi: Government Printer, 1977. p.44. 
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THE SOCIAL BASE OF HARAMBEE 
We first raised the question of what constitutes the vital social 
base for self-help, because we hypothesized that different strata and 
possibly different social classes would exhibit different levels of 
support. Our prime concern .in wanting to test this hypothesis, was to 
answer the question of whether the Kenyan Harambee movement is a vehicle 
of small farmers, or whether it is a vehicle through which rich peasants, 
in alliance with the state, coopt and tax and the rural masses. To the 
extent that our evidence supports one position or the other in this 
controversy, it supports the former — that the social base of self-help 
is very broad and is provided principally by a wide spectrum of land owners 
in the middle of the socio-economic hierachy. Our data further indicate 
that while landless peasants and "rich" fanners who own more than 20 
acres are the least likely to support self-help, the former believe that • 
they benefit from self-help to the same degree as middle peasants, while 
the latter are taxed in a mildly progressive ma ner to support the movement. 
Almost everybody in te the rural areas supports self-help, the only 
difference is the degree. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding in our data, one that is 
validated throughout our analysis, is that the relationship between social 
stratification, as measured by the amount of land owned, and support for 
self-help as measured by the number of Harambee projects they join, and 
their propensity to participate in each of eight types of projects, are 
what we term "small," "middle," and "upper -middle" peasants, a wide spectrum 
of the peasantry which includes those who own from 1 to 20 acres. 
The teiftns "small," "middle," and "upper-middle" are, of course, 
arbitrary distinctions. We use the term "small" to refer to farmers who 
own 1 or 5 acres of land, and who constitute 44 percent of our sample. 
By"middle peasants" we mean farmers who own between 6 and 10 acres of land. 
Respondents in this category comprise 16 percent of our sample. By "upper-
middle" we refer to those who own between 11 and 20 acres and who comprise 
6 percent of those surveyed for our study. Taken together, these three 
groups account for 72 percent of our respondents. They run the gamut from 
the moderately poor to those who are prosperous by Kenyan standards, but 
not "rich." Most significantly, these groups •* exclude the landless 
- 16 - IDS/WP 1440 
(22 percent) and the "rich" who own more than 20 acres (6 percent). 
Although respondents in the "middle" and "upper-middle" categories 
consistently exhibit higher levels of participation in self-help than 
those labeled "small," the members of all three groups are similar 
in their degreee of involvement in self-help, and are distinct 
from the landless and the rich. 
Table 5: Number of Projects Joined by Amount of Land Owned 
AMOUNT LAND OWNED 
NUMBER OF PROJECTS None 1-2 acres 3-5 acres acrfe^  11 "20 acr'ss 21 acres 
None; 26% 8% 8% 4% 3% 18% 
One of three: 47 31 29 32 27 36 
Four to sic: 17 37 39 27 30 18 
Seven or more: 10 24 24 38 40 27 
N = (342) (378) (444) ( 240) (100) (99) 
Average number 
projects joined: 2.5 4. 2 4.2 " 4.8 4. 8 3.5 
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Table 6; Percentage; of Respondents Who Have Participated in Each of Eight 
Types of Self-Help Projects by Amount of Land Owned* 
FCT PARTI CIPATIWG N o n e 
BY TYPE OF PROJECT 
Nursery school: 23% 
Primary school: 53 
Secondary school: 39 
Health clinic: 30 
Cattle dip: 27 
Water project: 25 
Mutual assistance 
group: 5 
Production $roup: 6 
N = (341) 
'"'Percentages total to more than 100 because most respondents participate 
in more than one project. 
The cuffivlinear relationship between land ownership and 
participation in Harambee is depicted clearly in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 
summarizes the extent of peasant participation in self-help in terms of 
the number of projects the respondents said they had joined. As indicated 
by the table, 9 2 to 9 7 percent of those owning from 1 to 20 acres said they 
participated by landless respondents was 74 percent, while the level for 
"rich" peasants was 82. While most respondents in all categories said 
they participated I n several projects, this tendency is markedly greater 
among the "small" !jnd especially among the "middle" and "upper-middle" 
groups. "Small" peasants who own 1 to 5 acres of land thus participated 
in an average of 4.2 projects each, while the figure for the "middle" and 
"upper-middle" peasants was 4.8. Almost 40 percent of the latter two 
categories, moreover, participate in seven projects or more,® By contrast, 
AMOUNT LAND OWNED 














































(378) (444) (240) (100) (98) 
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landless respondents participated in an average of '2.5 projects, while 
the rich participated in 3.5. Notwithstanding these variations, the most 
important finding in Table 5 is that the Harambee movement rests on a 
firm social base. Because 72 perceht of the sample own 1 to 20 acres, 
those in this category who participate in self-help constitute 67 percent of 
all respondents. Assuming our data is an accurate representation of rural 
Kenya, two thirds of the rural population are thus landed and frequent 
participants in self-help. Even if the landless poor and rich did'not 
participate, and they do, Harambee would have a firm footing in the 
countryside. 
The curvilinear relationship between land ownership and 
participation in self-help is again illustrated in Table 6 where we 
present the level of participation for each of the eight most common 
types of Harambee projects. As indicated by the table, the curvilinear 
relationship holds for all eight types of projects though the highest 
level of support shifts slightly between those who own 6 and 10 acres and 
those who own 11 and 20, our "middle" and "upper-middle" categories. 
The relationship is thus maintained for both large projects such as 
secondary schools and water schemes, and small projects including 
nursery school, cattle dips, and mutual assistance groups. The 
relationship also holds for both the most popular projects, mutual 
assistance groups and production groups which provide collective goods to 
a restricted segment of the community. 
In addition to demonstrating broad and deep support for self-
help across the "small'1 and "middle" peasantry, Table? 5 and 6 suggest 
three additional conclusions. The first, is that small • and middle 
peasants are the ones most likely to participate in self-help because they 
have the most to gain from the enterprise and at the same time can 
afford to participate. Although the landless need the benefits self-
help offer and participate, their ability to participate is less. Conversely, 
/ t h e ^ich have little or less to participate, but often do so . 
' out of considerations of social obligation and status vis a vis their 
neighbours. When asked why self-help was so popular in Kenya, half of 
those who owned land in all categories replied that Harambee "is the only 
way we can start schools, health clinics, et.c. in this area; development is 
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dependent upon self-help" while the proportion of landless which responded 
in this manner was one third. Another 8 percent of all groups said that 
"with Harambee, the local people determine what is to be done; there is 
local control." Self-help, in short, is supported most by those who 
recognize that they will only obtain basic human services if they provide 
these services for themselves on a collective goods basis, and by those 
who have the resources to do so. While support for self-help may thus 
involve a tax on rural Kenyans, it is not, as we shall see below, a tax 
that falls disporpotionately on the poorest members of rural society. 
Most important, it is a local tax by local people on themselves 
for local services, md not a method by which the state appropriates 
resources from the ^untryside to the center. Indeed just the opposite 
is true. To the exlent that the state is pressured into providing a 
portion of the recurrent expenditure for self-help • projects after 
they are established in ruj?>al communities (e.g. providing the salaries 
for certified teasers for Harambee schools), Harambee is a local tax that 
25 extracts a matching funds from the center. 
A second, and related conclusion, and on which is supported 
26 • 
further by data we have presented elsewhere, is that self-help consists 
largely of small projects that operate autonomously with little assistance 
or direction from the state. While large projects such as secondary schools, 
health clinics and water projects invariably seek state assistance and 
often receive it, the overwhelming majority of projects are small projects 
25. State provision of the revrecurrent expenditures for Harambee is 
onw viewec with increasing alarm by the center. See John M. Cohen 
and Richar3 M. Hook, "District Development Planning in Kenya," 
>s, Development-' Discussion Paper No. 229, Harvard Institute for 
International Development", April, 1986, p.77. 
26. Joel D. S^rkan, "Self-Help Organizations, State and Society", op.cit. 
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which establish no links to the state. These include nursery and primary 
schools,, mutual assistance and production groups, and cattle dips (some 
of which are occasionally state aided). These projects attract high 
levels of participation from relatively small catchment'areas, and have 
laid down a vertible carpet of small locally rooted organizations across 
27 
rural Kenya. Given the nature of its social base, the existence of 
this "organizational infrastructure" provides rural residents the means 
to resist encroachment by the center, if not always the means to become 
linked to the state for the purpose of extracting state resources. 
Third, the strong support for self-help by the middle peasantry 
together with the dropoff in support by the landless and the rich, 
suggest that self-help does not involve the manipulation of the rural 
poor by the landed rich in alliance with the center. Stated simply, 
rural residents are rational actors who pursue their self-interest within 
the resources, at their disposal. Their participation in self-help, which is 
clearly selective and varies greatly from one type of project to another, 
is in large part of the result of an assessment that it is in their 
28 interest to do so. Neither the landed rich nor the center, moreover, 
27. Catchment areas for most self-help projects generally exceed 5 kilometres. 
See Joel D. Barkan, "Development Through Self-Help:' The Forgoteen 
Alternative," Rural Africana, 19-20, Spring-Fall, 1984, pp.128-9. 
28. Because they are projects which produce collective goods, self-help 
efforts are always susceptable to the problem of "free riders" and 
most •' • rural residents are cautious about joining such efforts. 
For a discussion of the conditions .under which peasants are 
prepared to join collective goods efforts, See Samuel Popkin, 
The Rational Peasant. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1979. pp.252-8. 
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posses the means to coerce small and middle peasants into participating 
in Harambeee on a sustained basis. Nor is it in their interests to do so. 
Indeed, if there is coercion to participate and contribute to self-
help, it is most likely coercion levied from within the local community 
by small and middle peasants on themselves and on the landless and rich 
rather than coercion levied from within the local community by small and 
middle peasants on themselves and on the landless and rich rather than 
coercion levied from without. 29 
Table 7: Number of Projects for which Respondents a Leader by Amount of 
Land Owned 
LEAD 
AMOUNT ' LAND OWNED 
. OF PROJECTS 









None: 90% 80% 7 8% 76% 64% 70% 
One: 4 11 12 10 14 12 
Two or more: 5 9 10 14 22 18 
N = (342) (378) (444) (240) (100) (99) 
Number1 of project 
leaders: (31) (76) (98) (58) (36) (30) 
29. Eleven percent of our respondents reported that they had at 
some time been coerced into contributing to a self-help project. 
There was little variance, however, across landholding groups. 
The percentage of landless and small peasants who said they had 
experienced was 10 and 12 percent respectively. The 
percentage of middle peasants was 9 percent while • . the 
percentage for those classified as rich was 11. When asked 
whether it was sometimes necessary asto force people to contribute 
to Harambee porjects for the good of the local community, 56 percent 
of the small peasant respondents and 52 percent of the middle 
peasants said "yes", while the percentage for rich peasants was 40. 
Forty-nine percent of the landless respondents also favored coerced 
contributions. 
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Turning briefly to the question of who leads self-
help, Tai.^ e 7 suggests what we might expect; that the landless are 
least likely to be leaders of Harambee projects, while "upper-middle" 
and ''rich" peasants who own more than 11 acres are the most likely 
to lead. In contrast to the relationship between the amount of land 
owned and project participation, the relationship between the amount 
of land owned and being a project leader is always positive rather 
than curvilinear. The variance in the propensity to lead projects, 
however, is not pronounced, especially among those who own land. 
Though they are m«st likely to be drawn from the most prosperous 
farmers, project leaders come from the entire spectrum of the rural 
population. Indeed, when one compares the actual number of respondents 
within each category of the peasantry who indicated that they had 
been a project leader, instead of comparing the percentages which 
did so, one finds that the greatest number of project leaders are 
"small®'' peasants, that is to say, those who own between 1 and 5 acres. 
This finding again suggests that self-help- is a largely autonomous 
phenomena consisting of many small projects lead by "typical" members 
of the rural community. 
WHO PAYS AND WHO BENEFITS? 
We turn now to the question which has already been mentioned 
in the foregoing discussion: Who pays for self-help, and who benefits? 
Is self-help a tax on the rural poor, or is it a tax on the rich? 
To what extent does self-help redistribute resources within rural 
communities, and between rural communities and the center? The 
scope of this essay does not permit a detailed examination of the 
extent to which self-help is a mechanism for transfering resources 
from the center to the periphery of rural Kenya, but it is the authors* 
contention that the net flow of benefits is in this direction. While 
many correctly contend that self-help was initially encouraged and 
given official blessing to shift the cost of providing social welfare 
services from the state to the peasantry, the net result of the 
Harambee movement has been to transfer more resources from the center 
than would have occurred had the movement never emerged and grown 
to its present size. Private transfer payments to self-help projects 
in the form of small but daily contributions by salaried members of 
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the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and urban wage earners are substantial 
as any visitor to Nairobi can attest. While data on the total amount 
of these transfers are virtually impossible to obtain, it is clear 
that these payments annually run in the millions of shillings. Public 
transfer payments in the form of state provision of the recurrent costs 
of Harambees most notably secondary schools, are also substantial, and 
the authors are presently attempting to assess the magnitude of these 
expenditures. 
In respect to the question of who pays for self-help within 
the local community, Tables 8 and 9 provide some meaningful insights 
of the type only survey data can provide. Citizen contributions to 
self-help take two forms: contributions in cash, and contributions in 
kind, especially labor. A commonly held assumption is that the rich, 
if they pay at all, are more likely to contribute cash while the poor 
are more likely to contribute labor because they do not have the cash. 
Our data, however, suggest that this generalization is true, but with 
one important caveat. 
i 
' Table 8:^Amount Money Respoi^^^^s^Contributed by Amojjn^ t 
oJ^Land Owned 
AMOUNT LAND OWNED 
None 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-20 21 + 
AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED acres acres acres acres acres 
None: 32% 10% 5% 6% 
1/—to 50/-: 33 34 21 20 13 14 
51/-to 100/-: 10 19 19 ltt . 15 11 
101/-to 200/-: 9 19 21 18 30 18 
201/-to 400/-: 7 13 18 16 -14 18 
401/-or more: 10 12 16 22 24 34 
N = (226) (289) (342) (206) (87) (73) 
Est. Ave. Contribution 95/- 144/- 177/- 190/- 210/- 246/-
Pet. of all respond-
ants in sample: 18.5 23.6 28.0 16.8 7.1 6.0 
Pet. total land -owned 
by sample: 0.0 6.2 19.7 23.7 18.9 31.5 
Pet. of total money con-
tributed by sample 10.8 21.0 30.4 19.6 9.2 9.0 
Contribution index 
(by population): 58 89 109 117 130 150 
Contribution index (by 
amount land owned): St 339 154 83 49 29 
Because landless peasants own no land, an index figure cannot be ' comput 
If one arbitrarily assumed a figure of .1 pet., the index.- *ou Id be 10,800! 
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As indicated by the top; half of Table 8, one third of the 
landless poor contributed nothing to self-help in the year prior to our 
survey, while the proportion for those who owned land was, excepting 
those with 6 to 10 acres, 5 percent. Conversely, the magnitude of 
contributions rises steadily as the amount of land owned rises. An 
estimate of the average contribution by each individual within each 
category of land owner is provided in the first row below the entries 
for the N for each column. .These estimates indicate clearly that those 
who are relatively prosperous pay more, and that there is a substantial 
jump between the average contribution of the landless and all categories 
of land owners including those with holdings of.only 1 to 2 acres. 
From their standpoint as individual members ©f the community, individual 
contributions to self-help constitute a mildly progressive tax. At the 
very least, resources are not being transferred from the "poor" to the 
"rich''1 or even to the "middle". The extent to which land owners in 
each category overpay or underpay the bills for Hartimbee is indicated 
by the entries f<»r the Contribution Index (by population). As shewn 
by the entries, the total contribution by all landless respondents 
(computed by multiplying the number of landless respondents by the 
estimated average contribution for the group, in this case 95 shillings) 
was 58 percent of what their proportion of the total population (sample) 
predicts they should contribute. "Small" farmers contribute roughly 
what their numbers require as those owning 1 to 2 acres contributed 
•89 percent of their quota while those owning 3 to 5 acres contributed 
109 percent. The index figures steadily rise to the point where "rich" 
peasants with more than 21 acres contribute 150 percent of what their 
numbers require. 
But while those with more land pay more, and while it is 
clear that resources are not transferred from landless and small 
peasants, it is doubtful whether those who are most prosperous pay 
the same proportion of their income as their less affluent neighbors. 
Because we have stratified our sample on the basis of land owner-
ship rather than income, we are unable for the purposes of this 
paper, to compute what proportion of personal income the average 
member of each land ownership category contributes to self-help. 
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The contribution index (by amount land owned), however, is highly 
suggestive. In this index we attempt to determine whether respondents 
overpay or underpay on the basis of the proportion of the total amount 
of land owned by the entire sample which each category of land owners 
hold. Because the proportion of all land owned by the landless is 
zero, we cannot calculate an index figure for this group. As suggested 
by the entires for all categories of land owners, however, "small" 
peasants pay from 154% to o39% of what their land resources would 
predict, while "middle,1? upper-middle," and especially the "rich" 
peasants underpay. Stated simply, from the standpoint of the magnitude 
of individual assessments, the "middle," "upper-middle" and "rich" 
pay more that the average. From the standpoint of their ability to 
pay, however, they pay less. Yet it should be noted that just as 
payments are assessed to and paid by individuals rather than to units 
of land resources (i.e. farmes), the benefits of self-help are largely 
(with the exception of cattle dips) enjoyed by individuals. Those 
with relatively large land holdings may underpay on the basis 
of their resources, but they probably do not overutilize self-help 
services on the basis of their numbers. Put differently, they may 
underpay on the basis of their ability to pay;, but they overpay 
in terms of the individual benefits they receive. To that extent, 
they subsidize the less affluent. 
The picture in respect to contribution in labor is some-
what different. As one would expect, the magnitude of labor contribu-
tions declines as one moves across the spectrum of land owners from 
"small" peasants to "rich." The drop, however, is not precipitous, 
indeed there is a slight rise as the "rich" report greater labor 
contributions than "upper-middle" peasants. Most significantly, 
the landless, whom one would have expected to be the greatest 
contributors of labor because of their poverty, contribute the least. 
Indeed two thirds of the respondents with no land said they contributed 
no labor at all, and the average contribution was 4.9 days — less 
than half the average contribution by all other strata. Using our 
indicies of contributions, the question of overpayment and under-
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Table 9; Amount Labor Respondent Has Contributed by Amount of Land 
Owned 













None : 66% 18% 20% 36% 36% 17% 
1 to 5 days: 16 22 25 17 16 22 
6 to 10 days: 5 8 9 8 9 11 
11 to 30 days: 6 12 10 11 21 28 
31 days or more: 7 40 37 28 18 22 
N = (188) (241) ( 228) (148) (56) (46) 
Est. Ave.contribu-
tion: 4.9 19. 7 18-. 3 14.6 12.6 15,9 
Pet. of all respond-
ants in ..-«.• • i V o r sample 18.5 23. 6 28.0 16.8 7.1 6.0 
Pet. of total land 
owned by 
sample 0.0 6.2 19.7 23.7 18.9 31.5 
Pet. of total labor 
contributed 
by sample: 6.8 35. 3 31.0 16.1 5.2 5.4 
Contribution index 
(by popula-
tion): 37 150 111 96 73 30 
Contribution index 
(by amount 
land owned): 569 157 68 28 17 
''•'Because landless peasants own no land, an index figure cannot be computed. 
If one arbitrarily assumed a figure of .1 pet., the index would be 
6800. 
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payment is as follows: On the basis of population, the landless 
pay only 37 percent of what their numbers predict, "small1, peasants 
pay somewhat more than their numbers warrant, while "middle," "upper-
middle" and "rich" peasants underpay. Small peasants, especially those 
with only 1 to 2 acres of land are the greatest providers of labor 
contributions. Turning lastly to the contribution index calculated 
on the basis "of land resources, the pattern reported in Table 8 
is replicated but in a more extreme manner. Since the relatively 
wealthy would prefer to contribute cash rather than labor, it is not 
surprising that the degree of underpayment. is higher than it is 
when the contributions are in the former medium. In sum, when it 
comes to contributions in labor, those owning 6 acres or .more do not, 
as a group, pay their expected share. 
We turn lastly to the question of which strata of the 
peasantry benefit most from self-help? Our data to answer this 
questionare purely subjective in that they consist of our respondents' 
beliefs about the degree to which they believe they have benefited 
from self-help, and thei 1 anticipations for future benefits. We 
possess no data on the actual amounts of specific benefits each 
respondent has received from self-help. Notwithstanding the subjective 
nature of the data, it is striking to note that the highest assessments 
of the benefits received from self-help are given by landless and 
"small" peasants. As indicated in Table 10 roughly three fifths of 
all respondents believe that they have "benefited a great deal" from 
projects in their area, while virtually no one reported that they 
received "none." 
'Table 10: Perceived Benefits_ from Self-Hclp by Amount of Land Owned 
AMOUNT LAND OWNED 
None 1-2 
PERCEIVED BENEFITS acres 
Great deal: 65% 59% 
Some benefits: 17 25 
Very few benefits: 15 16 
None: 3 
N = (241) (353) 
3-5 6-10 11-20 21+ 
acres acres acres acres 
59% 57% 64% 56% 
30 31 28 34 
10 12 8 9 
1 — — 1 
419) (229) (96) (86) 
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Table 11:' Did Respondent Expect Benefits in_ the Future by Amount 
Larid Owned. 












Yes : 92% 86% 93% 92% 91% 86% 
No: 8 14 7 8 9 14 
N = (121) (108) (113) (71) (34) (36) 
Those who reported receiving '''very few" benefits seem to be clustered 
among landless and small peasants suggesting that there are some 
members of this group who are left behind. The basic message of 
Table 10, however, is that belief in the value of self-help is broad based 
and strongest among the rural poor. What amounts to a deep faith 
in self-help is even more powerfully demonstrated in Table 11. Data 
presented in the table is in response to the question: "Although 
you may have not received many benefits from these projects, do you 
think that you and the members of your household will receive more 
benefits in the future?" The question was put in this manner to 
assess the extent of support for self-help in the future, and to 
assess the level of support among those who nay not have benefited 
from some projects at the time of our study for reasons of ineligibility; 
for example, respondents who contributed to a secondary school, but 
whose children were too young to attend. The results presented in 
the table speak for themselves, and again demonstrate that support 
is broad based. Indeed, if there is any softness in the high level 
of support for Harambee it is among "rich" peasants owning more 
than 20 acres. Both Tables 10 and 11 indicate a slight dropoff in 
enthusiasm among the rual rich. Although the extent of dropoff is 
within sampling error, it suggests that far from manipulating self-
help, the rich regard Harambee as an exercise which they subsidize. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KENYAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
This paper has addressed itself to the question: "What is 
the social basis of self-help?;i Our response is that the base is the 
broad majority of what we have termed "the small and middle peasantry," 
and the "rich" as well. We found that self-help is extremely popular 
among them; that they usually participate in more than one project; 
that they are taxed in a moderately progressive fashion, but that they 
perceive substantial benefits and are very positive about the role of 
self-help in their futures. 
The rural poor have a different and more complex relation 
to self-help. They do not have power within it. They are less likely 
to be leaders and many do not contribute money or labor, while others 
contribute only small amounts. Those that do contribute may well 
contribute a greater proportion of their income than do middle peasants 
and the wealthy. At the same time, however, the poor overwhelmingly 
believe that they benefit from the process. Indeed, a good number of 
them are virtual ^ free riders in that they contribute little to project 
construction, but ultimately use the facility. 
30 
In an overall context of state bias against small holders, 
self-help affords small and middle peasants a measure of leverage on 
the state, and results in state policies that are least injurious 
to the rural poor. In a situation where few, if any well-funded 
policies are designed, let alone implemented to benefit the landless 
and rural poor, state toleration of self-help may be the most positive 
of Kenya's rural development policies. Kenya's rural poor would 
strongly agree. Self-rhelp, however, is by no means the t;ideal policy1'' 
or process for the rural poor. Ultimately, their interests lie in 
obtaining heavily subsidized social services, particularly education, 
.meaningful land reform, and rapidly expanding and well renumerated 
30Stephen Peterson, "Neglecting the Poor: State Policy Toward the 
Small holder in Kenya," in Stephen K. Comrnins et. al. (eds.), 
Africa's Agrarian Crisis:_The Roots of Famine. Boulder; Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 1986, pp."59-83 
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wage employment. With the expansion of off-farm employment unlikely 
to occur due to a slow growing economy, and with land reform barred 
by the interests and power of the wealthy, self help,1 and the basic 
needs it provides, is not without interest for those supportive of 
poor peasant interests. 
Identifying the broad social base of self-help also helps 
us to understand the position of the peasantry and self-help; in Kenyan 
politics and their significance for development policy. The broad and 
deep support and participation by the middle peasants together with 
the rich, and the strong support, if not participation by the poor, 
help explain the power of the movement ana the minimal accountability 
that peasants force upon the state. The political dynamics of self-
help have given peasants some leverage over the state for social 
welfare development. Put differently, self-help has resulted in a 
greater expenditure of state funds on rural social welfare services 
than the state intended to provide, and turned peasant-state relations 
towards the peasants' advantage.^ 
The broad small holder base of self-help, and its autonomous 
character has also laid down a veritable carpet of local organizations 
across the rural landscape, an organizational infrastructure consisting 
of an experienced local local leadership having multiple contacts 
with state personnel and procedure. Project density is advantageous 
to peasants approached by state programs, and the state in search of 
32 rural organizations and local contacts for its projects and programs 
Frank Holmquist, "Self-Help: The State and Peasant Leverage in 
Kenya," op. cit. and John M. Cohen and Richard M. Ho.ok, "District Develop-
ment Planning in Kenya,'' op. cit. 
32 Joel D. Barkan, "Development Through Self-Help," op. cit., pp. 
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The broad social roots of self-help among the peasantry and peasant 
leverage have forced the bureaucracy to acknowledge that they ignore 
peasant opinion, local leaders and local organizations at their 
peril. This form of accountability may only happen when it is forced 
upon the state from below -- again, a testament to the autonomous 
character of most self-help activity. 
Our search for the social base of self-help has als*» revealed 
that self-help is community based as defined by ownership of land. 
That is to say, for those not rooted in the community by virtue of 
control over land, despite other indicators ©f status, they will be 
less engaged in self-help and less likely to lead it than middle 
peasants. Those wealthy in land, on the other hand, will be mere 
drawn to self-help than the wealthy without land, but less involved 
than small holder peasants. 
The broad based participation and predominance of initiative 
among the peasantry allows self-help t«t iccur in lieu of the state 
as much as in concert with the state. The popular view is that self-
help is the only way to develop the countryside—that communities 
cannot wait for the state to provide assistance. Self-help, despite 
its intimate relationship with clientelist hierarchies, and often 
bureaucratic personnel, is also deeply autonomous. Most projects 
function independently at the grassroots level and are not linked to 
either the state, or external leaders or resources. 
Self-help has a classically populist appeal to small and 
middle peasants whose world view posits a united peasant community 
in uneasy relation to the state. Peasant ideology and consciousness 
is all but unexplored in the literature but Njuguna Ng'ethe's work 
is a rare and penetrating analysis of the interplay of official and 
33 
peasant ideology in the rise of self-help after independence. He 
argues convincingly that soon after Independence, President Kenyatta 
found himself in a quandry. Parliament and KANU were deeply divided 
into ideological, ethnic, regional and personal factions that made it 
33 Njuguna Ng'ethe, Harambee and/Development^ Participation in Kenya. 
op. cit. 
_ 32 - IDS WP 44-0 
increasingly difficult, from his perspective, to govern. In an 
effort to deflect these divisions away from the center, Kenyatta began 
to articulate a new rationale for constituency service based on the 
already extant self-help motif. Kenyatta in effect told the politicians 
(particularly Members of Parliament) to "do something useful"—to 
help initiate and organize self-help efforts in their constituencies, 
and that the government would help those who helped themselves. Self-
help would be a cooperative effort involving the people and the state. 
This message resonated extremely well with small property owners 
who perceived their community facing an aloof outside world, but one 
that may be influenced with the right approach and with the right 
allies, 
The politics and attitudes of small farmers toward the 
Kenyan state are deeply ambiguous. As believers in small property 
they support a capitalist structure. But they also perceive abuses 
in the form of corruption, misuse of office, ethnic favoritism, 
nepotism and a great political distance between themselves, the 
dominant classes and the state. Our data reveal that while the middle 
peasants, indeed the majority of all peasants, believe that self-
help may help them get s-mething from the state, they increasingly 
know that they must fend for themselves. This is particularly true 
given the fiscal crises Kenya has faced in the 1980s, and the restruc-
turing of the provincial and district administration to implement 
a new policy of administrative decentralization know as District Focus. 
While the impact of this administrative and political 
restructuring upon self-help is unclear, a major impetus to district 
Focus was the desire to "get a hold on self-help" and limit the 
incidence of uncontrolled initiative from below which, given the 
logic of self-help, raises the pressure to devote a greater proportion 
of state funds, particularly recurrent expenditures, to self-help 
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induced social services than the state wishes to provide." With a 
more controlled local planning apparatus under administrative aegis 
with District Focus, the intent is to give the green light to selected 
projects in keeping with scaled back fiscal possibilities, and in 
the process effectively dampen initiative "outside the plan.11 Initiative 
will then lie primarily with the state, local involvement will dimish, 
and former self-help projects with possible state participation are 
likely to become state projects with possible local participation. 
The result is likely to parallel the experience with 
Kenya's Rural Development Fund where the state closely regulated the 
pace of project development and proved chronically unable to summon 
up local participation and labor on demand. Thus, self-help may be 
reigned in, and with it the primary political vehicle of the middle 
peasantry. All this occurs amidst a recent atmosphere of policy 
deference toward /production and wealthy peasants, if not capitalist 
farmers, created by aid agencies with their prescriptions in response 
35 
to fiscal crisis, external debt and balance of payments problems. 
On the other hand, because most projects are small and autonmous, it 
is also likely that any attempt to rein in self-help fail. Projects 
which have emerged solely through local initiative and local resources 
are likely to continue that way, at least in the short term. Given 
this reality, the net result of District Focus may merely be a 
clarification of the rules of the game via which middle peasants and 
their representatives will contest for the shrinking pie of state 
assistance. 
34 Acknowledgement of the inherent tension betweer self-help and 
government attempts to control expenditures at the local level is 
candidly noted by the consultants responsible for designing and 
implementing the district'level planning procedures on which 
District Focus is based. See John M, Cohen and Richard M. Hook, 
"District Development and Planning in Kenya," Development Discussion 
Paper 229. Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Develop-
ment, April 1986, p. 77 
35 Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Washington: The'World ~ Bank T19 81 
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One could, however, see District Focus as a vehicle to 
accelerate the transition to capitalism and p2?OVlCLG ci way out of the 
recent fiscal crisis. In this model, most powerfully stated at a 
3 6 
general level by Gavin Kitching, there is no room for development 
based upon the small holder peasantry. There is instead only an 
implicit "real capitalism" based upon large rural producers coupled 
with a serious industrial thrust, again based upon large producers. 
According to Kitching, populist scenarios of economies based upon 
middle (or small) peasant producers have not worked. Well-meaning, 
but ultimately deadend, efforts to dodge the horrors of capitalist 
transitions have only delayed the transition and perversely extended 
the suffering. 
Kitching's brilliant exposition almost masks the fact that 
he has his history wrong. There are recent', and past examples of 
rather vigorous capitalist transitions based upon small holder peasants 
37 
such as Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, etc. 
We see no reason why a transition to capitalism cannot be effectively 
carried out on a small holder base in Kenya. Indeed, we see no 
alternative. Without a vigorous internal market which only a relatively 
prosperous small holder peasantry can provide. Kenya's industrializa-
tion would have to depend upon the demand of a wealthy few, or upon 39 
a rapidly expanding export capacity, or both. Neither seem likely. 
3 6 
Gavin Kitching, Development and Underdevelopment in Historical 
Perpsective. LoridonT ITethuen" 19027 and'Gavin'"Kitc'hXng,~ "Politics, 
Method, and Evidence in the 'Kenya Debate1, 11 in Henry F '"nstein 
and Bonnie K. CAMPBELL (eds.), Contradictions of'Accumulation in 
Africa. Beverly Hills: Sage PiMicatxoras~* 1985'." 37 .Robert Bideleux, Communism and ^eysl^pnient. London; Methuen, 1985, p. 38 "'Leo, Land and_Class ir!'Kenya op. cit., pp. 171-98 
39 Martin Godfrey , "Prospects for a Basic Needs Strategy: The 
Case of Kenya," IDS Bulletin, 9:4 (June, 1978), pp. 41-44 
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And to enforce highly skewed income distribution and growing centralized 
control of the means of production, including land, would require an 
expanded and more repressive state apparatus as the Latin American 
40 experience would suggest. 
This discussion helps put self-help and its middle peasant 
base into political and developmental perspective. If it is true thaf 
a viable long-term industrial and development policy in Kenya requires 
a reasonably prosperous peasantry, it also begs the question^^what 
matrix of forces will direct state policy in this direction. Needless 
to say, a populist state cannot simply be summoned up on demand. 
Self-help provides a mechanism of defense to small holders 
41 
in a very difficult situation. Ironically, it is also affords the 
state measure of legitimacy. Self-help, in short is not a zero-sum 
game for small holder peasants or the state. In the continental context 
of the near complete decay of state capacity and structures, this 
vehicle of legitimacy is no small asset for both the peasantry and the 
state. One of the reasons that self-help has been so durable in Kenya 
is that the state is reasonably predictable. Local organization, 
initiative, regular elections, clientelist alliances, and well-known 
avenues for exerting influence, coupled with fairly reliable state 
funding and management of projects the state takes over, gives everyone 
something to shoot for. The whole effort is not t(pie-in-the-sky.lt 
But if, as has occured elsewhere in Africa, further political departicipa-
42 
tion, a coup d'etat, or chronic civil disturbances (or warfare) 
break out (e.g. Uganda), the self-help system would breakdown and with 
it would go the primary vehicle of small holder political leverage. On 
the other hand, it is precisely because the Kenyan state has been 
predictable and given rise to local organization, initiative and 
regular elections that we can talk about a Kenyan political system 
where the probability for political decay is low. 
40 Frederick S. Weaver, Class, 'State and Industrial Structure: The 
Historical Process of South American Industrial" Growth." "Vtes^ ort:, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980 
41 Frank Holmquist, "Defending Peasant Political Space in Independent 
Africa" op.cit. 
42 i\<_xQon Kasfir, The_ Shrinking 'Political Arena. Berkeley:University of Calii;^nj_a press' 1973". 
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